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V 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter "MBNA"), to confirm 
arbitration awards. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 7-911, an arbitration award may only be 
confirmed if there was a contractual agreement between the parties providing that any dispute 
arising between the parties will be resolved by arbitration. Both the Appellants in this action, 
David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll (hereinafter "Capps and Carroll"), have argued that they 
did not agree to arbitration. Further, Capps and Carroll have also argued that the laws of the 
State of Idaho control the dispute, and not the laws of the State of Delaware. MBNA has argned 
that the laws of the State of Delaware control and that MBNA has properly exercised its right to 
unilaterally amend the agreement under Delaware law. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
MBNA filed an arbitration claim against each of the Appellants with the National Arbitration 
Forum (hereinafter "NAF"). Capps (R. Vol. I, p.140-143) and Carroll (R. Vol. I, p. 138-139) 
both timely objected in writing to the arbitration proceeding based on no agreement to arbitrate. 
MBNA and the NAF arbitrator proceeded over the objections of Capps and Carroll. Capps and 
Cafroll did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. The NAF issued an award letter against 
Capps (R. Vol. II, p. 389) and against Carroll (R. Vol. I, p. 16). Carroll filed suit against MBNA 
on September 30, 2005 (case CV 36747- R. Vol. I, p. 1-7 and p. 8-14) after receiving the award 
letter and Capps filed suit against MBNA on November 3, 2005 (case CV-36827), both within 
the 90 day time limit specified in Idaho Code Section 7-912(b), seeking to have the award letters 
vacated. MBNA filed to confirm the award letter against Capps through Wilson & McColl, 
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Attorneys at Law in Boise, Idaho, on January 17, 2006 (case CV-2006-5, filed in Lewis County 
(R. Vol. I, p. 386-89), which became CV-37201 when transferred to Idaho County). MBNA also 
filed to confirm the award letter against Carroll through Bishop, White & Marshall, Attorneys at 
Law in Seattle Washington on June 6, 2006 (case CV-37320-R. Vol. II, p. 398). MBNA filed 
for Summary Judgment against each of the Appellants, which was denied (R. Vol. I, p. 20-35). 
On April 20, 2006 the cases (CV-36747 and CV-36827) against MBNA by Capps and Carroll 
were combined into case CV-36747 (R. Vol. II, p.390). 
The District Court held a hearing on the issue of whether there was an agreement to arbitrate. 
Following the Court's decision on September 14, 2006 (R. Vol I, p. 100-109) that there was an 
agreement to arbitrate and confirming the award letters, Capps and Carroll filed a Rule l l(a) 
I.R.C.P. Motion for Reconsideration, followed by an amended Motion for Reconsideration on 
October 10, 2006 (R. Vol. I, p.110-129), which was ultimately denied on November 9, 2007 (R. 
Vol. J, p. 338-358). The confirmation case against Capps (CV-37201) was consolidated into the 
combined case, and post judgment, on December 7, 2007, the confirmation case against Carroll 
(CV-37320) was also consolidated into the combined case (R. Vol. I, p. 367). Capps and Carroll 
then appealed the District Court's decision that there was an agreement to arbitrate on November 
15, 2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 359-366), and subsequently filed an Amended Notice ofinterlocutory 
Appeal on December 7, 2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 368-375). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Carroll opened a credit card account with MBNA on March 15, 1980 (R. Vol. I, p. 36-7). 
Capps opened a credit card account with MBNA on February 20, 1999 (R. Vol I. p. 73-4 ). 
Carroll provided an affidavit stating that she did not agree to arbitrate any dispute with MBNA 
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and that the original agreement between Carroll and MBNA did not contain an agreement to 
arbitrate (R. Vol. I, p. 37, L.5-9). Capps provided an affidavit stating that he did not agree to 
arbitrate any dispute with MBNA and that the original agreement between Capps and MBNA did 
not contain an agreement to arbitrate (R. Vol. I, p. 74, L.5-9). It is undisputed that the original 
credit card agreement did not contain an arbitration clause requiring the parties to arbitrate any 
claims. 
MBNA claims to have unilaterally amended the credit card agreement in January of 2000 
to include a clause requiring any and all claims to be subject to arbitration with the NAF. Capps 
and Carroll claim to have not received any notification of arbitration and did not agree to any 
form of arbitration (R. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 7-8, and p. 74, L. 7-8). MBNA did not produce the 
original agreement, nor did MBNA include an agreement when filing for confirmation of the 
arbitration award letters against either Capps or Carroll as required by the Federal Arbitration 
Act [FAA] in Title 9 U.S.C. § 13. It is undisputed that the transactions involved in this action 
are for a consumer purpose. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ARGUMENT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT A DELA WARE CHOICE OF 
LAW PROVISION WAS VALID IN IDAHO CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACTS? 
MBNA cites Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S.Ct. 1559, 1564, 167 L.Ed2d 389 
(2007) followed by Nagle v. Herold, 30 F.Supp. 905, 906, (W.D. New York 1939), concluding 
with Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737, 116 S.Ct 1730, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 
( 1996) leading to the idea that the use of the laws of the state where a national bank is located is 
effectively mandated. That is not true. Watters only states that state law controls contract terms 
and does not specify -,;1hich state law should be used. The Nagle decision is in a Federal Court in 
the District of New York, is not binding on this court, and the Smiley decision only applies to 
interest rates and associated charges. None of these cases dictate, or even suggest, that Idaho law 
should not apply to the formation or modification of a contract. 
In contracts, a choice of law provision is not even reached until the plaintiff proves that 
there is a valid and enforceable contract to begin with. MBNA has failed to put the original 
contract on the court record and as such, has failed to prove the existence of a valid and 
enforceable contract. Even with the assumption that such a contract exists, the means of 
modifying the contract have not been established, and no proof of a proper modification to the 
contract has been provided by MBNA. There is also no proof that an agreement to arbitrate 
exists. 
MBNA argues that their amendment to include arbitration was not done unilaterally, and 
as such is not against the public policy of the State ofldaho. MBNA argues that the amendment 
4 
was properly done under Delawar<o law, specifically Title 5 § 952(a). In discussing that 
particular statute, the trial court clearly stated "In the case where there is clear statutory authority 
allowing unilateral amendment, courts have not hesitated to give effect to the mandate of the 
FAA that arbitration agreements must be enforced." According to the court's decision, under 
Delaware law, the amendment is unilateral. 
Statutes from other states that violate the public policy do not have to be given effect. In 
Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358 (NJ. Super. 2001) the question was whether or not to give 
effect to Delaware statute Title 5 § 952. The New Jersey court held, 
"Discover attempts to avoid Badie and the similar principles of New Jersey law by 
arguing that, under Delaware law (namely 5 Del. C. § 952), it was permitted to make 
such a unilateral addition to its credit card agreement. While Discover' s credit card 
agreement provides that Delaware law applies, the Delaware law clearly violates New 
Jersey Public Policy and under New Jersey law that choice of law provision cannot be 
given effect. In New Jersey, the unilateral addition of an arbitration agreement into a 
contract of adhesion cannot be given legal effect." 
In this case, it is uncontested that this is a contract of adhesion. 
MBNA states, "Here, there is no argument that Delaware law allows for an agreement to 
be amended without a meeting of the minds, and is therefore against the public policy of Idaho." 
MBNA then goes on to state, "Nevertheless, the record fails to establish that there was a lack of 
mutuality of obligation, contract specificity or a distinct understanding shared by the parties." 
Yet the Supplemental Affidavit of Capps (R. Vol. I, p. 315) states, "7. That I have never 
voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA America Bank at any 
time." The Supplemental Affidavit of Carroll (R. Vol. I, p. 312) also states, "7. That I have 
never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA America Bank at 
any time." These statements, under oath, certainly establish a lack of a distinct understanding 
shared by the parties. When Capps and Carroll asked MBNA for any evidence of a meeting of 
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the minds, MBNA provided nothing in response. There is clear evidence on the record that there 
was no meeting of the minds, and nothing that contradicts that evidence. Amendment of an 
agreement under Delaware statute Title 5 § 952(a) is done without a meeting of the minds and is 
clearly against the public policy of the State ofldaho. Delaware case law also does not 
recognize an agreement without a meeting of the minds. 
MBNA argues that, "In this case, there can be no doubt that Appellants consented to the 
amendment of the parties' agreement to include arbitration. While, silence or failure to reject an 
offer usually is not evidence of intent to accept the offer, an offer may be accepted by silence if 
the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to understand that assent may be manifested by 
silence or inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the offer." 
MBNA provides no evidence that Capps and Carroll intended to accept the offer. Contrary to 
MBNA's claims, Capps and Carroll have clearly stated in their affidavits that they "have never 
voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA America Bank at any 
time." Therefore there is no evidence of any kind that Capps and Carroll intended to accept the 
offer, only evidence of their lack of intent. If there is no demonstrated intent to accept the offer, 
silence and inaction does not create that consent. 
The Idaho Credit Code does allow for changes to be made in open-ended credit 
agreements, but those changes must be made with a meeting of the minds and cannot be made 
unilaterally. Neither of those conditions is present. Contrary to MBNA's claim, even though 
MBNA was allowed to amend its credit card agreement under Idaho law, the attempted change 
was not properly accomplished. 
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ARGUMENT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT 
TO ARBITRATE WITHOUT A "MEETING OF THE MINDS?" 
MBNA states, "the record fails to establish that there was a lack of mutuality of 
obligation, contract specificity or a distinct understanding shared by the parties." That statement 
is not true. The affidavits of Capps and Carroll both establish that there was no shared 
understanding by the parties regarding arbitration. MBNA has placed no evidence whatsoever 
on the record to counter the statements, made under oath, of Capps and Carroll, or to prove a 
meeting of the minds ever took place regarding arbitration. 
In Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353, 796 P.2d 1026 (1990), the Court of Appeals of 
Idaho held, 
"(2,3] Proof of a "meeting of the minds" requires evidence that the parties had a mutual 
understanding of the terms of their agreement and that they mutually assented to be 
boui1d by those terms. The determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to 
show a meeting of the minds to form an express agreement is a question of fact to be 
resolved by the trier of fact. Glenn v. Go/zinger, 106 Idaho 109,675 P.2d 824 (1984); 
Bischoffv. Quong-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 826, 748 P.2d 410 (Ct.App. 1987)." 
In Delaware, the process is the same. In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. 769 
F.Supp. 599, 629 (D.Del. 1991) on the issue of substituting High Fructose Corn Sweetener 
[HFCS] for sugar, the court held, 
"[19-21) 94. The Company's unilateral substitution ofHFCS for sugar in the syrup may 
be construed as an offer to amend paragraph 10 and the unamended contracts to provide 
for use of HFCS as the sweetener in the syrup. In order for the terms of a contract to be 
amended, both parties must manifest assent to the changed terms. If one party alters its 
performance, such alteration may be considered as an offer to amend the contract, and 
assent by the other party will be treated as an acceptance of the offer to substitute the 
altered terms. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 287 & comment a. Plaintiffs clearly 
have not manifested assent to amendment of their unamended contracts as they 
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incorporate paragraph 10 of the Consent Decrees to include HFCS in the absence of a 
corresponding amendment to the pricing provisions. 
The Company has not obtained plaintiffs' consent to substitute HFCS for granulated 
sugar from cane or beet as the sweetener in Coca-Cola beverage syrup, and consequently, 
the unamended contracts have not been amended to provide for the use of HFCS in place 
of sugar." 
In Carlson v. Hallinan Del.Ch., 925 A.2d 506, 524 (2006), the court held, 
"The burden is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence 
of the contract to which the defendant is a party. Three elements are necessary to prove 
the existence of an enforceable contract: (1) the intent of the parties to be bound by it; (2) 
sufficiently definite terms; and (3) consideration." 
There is no evidence that Capps and Carroll intended to be bound by an agreement to arbitrate. 
held, 
In Figueroa v. Kit-San Co. 123 Idaho 149 (App. 1992), the Court of Appeals ofldaho 
"[3] Parties to a contract must have a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds 
regarding essential contract terms in order for the contract to be binding. Thomas v. 
Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353, 796 P.2d 1026 (Ct.App. 1990); 67 AM.JUR.2D Sales§ 129, 
p. 398 (I.985). A meeting of the minds requires an expression of assent or conduct· 
sufficient to show agreement. 67 AM.JUR.2D Sales§ 129, p. 398." 
"[5-7] ... Silence ordinarily does not establish acceptance without knowledge that silence 
is a mode of acceptance and the offeree intends to accept. Vogt v. Madden, 110 Idaho 6, 
713 P.2d 442 (Ct.App. 1985); Eimco Div., Envirotech Corp. v. United Pac/fie Ins. Co., 
109 Idaho 762, 710 P.2d 672 (Ct.AfP· 1985); See J. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, 
CONTRACTS § 2-21, p. 63-68 (211 ed. 1977). A party cannot state an agreement on his 
own terms and unilaterally form a contract. D.R. Curtis Company v. Mason, I 03 Idaho 
476,649 P.2d 1232 (Ct.App. 1982). 
There is no evidence on the record establishing a meeting of the minds regarding arbitration. 
The trial court's decision that there was a meeting of the minds is not based on substantial and 
competent evidence and should be reversed . 
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ARGUMENT III 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT DELAWARE LAW 
CONTROLLED THE DISPUTE? 
MBNA argues that because Capps and Carroll did not specifically raise the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence 1002, 1003 and 1004 in the district court that the entire issue cannot be considered 
or reviewed. Just because the specific Rules of Evidence were not raised by Capps and Carroll 
in the trial court does not excuse MBNA from complying with them. MBNA bears the burden of 
proving the existence of an enforceable contract, and the existence of an enforceable agreement 
to arbitrate. MBNA has done neither. 
The fact that the original agreement did not contain an arbitration provision is 
uncontested. MBNA had the burden of proving that they amended the contract according to the 
terms of the original agreement. MBNA presented no evidence of the original agreement, or of 
the terms and conditions of the original agreement. Without that evidence on the court record, 
there is no proof that the alleged arbitration provision was ever properly made, and is therefore 
not a proper part of the agreement. 
MBNA claims to have amended the agreement under Delaware Code Title 5 § 952(a) 
(addressed in Argument V below), but the statute only applies when the agreement does not 
otherwise prohibit amendment of the agreement. Without the original agreement on the court 
record, there is no proof that the Delaware statute applies. MBNA has failed to prove the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate. 
Other states are reaching the same conclusion. See the following cases: 
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CACY v. Corda, 2005 WL 3664087 (Conn. Super. Dec. 16, 2005) "The assignee alleged that 
the arbitration clause in a brochure filed with the court was the one to which the debtor 
consented. But, the court found that there was no evidence, aside from the assignee's assertion, 
that the debtor ever agreed to any such thing. The case was dismissed." 
Creech v. MBNA, 250 S.W.3d 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) "We affirm the trial court's judgment 
that Appellant (MBNA) failed to prove that the agreement between Respondent (Creech) and 
Appellant was included or amended to include an arbitration provision." 
FIA v. Thompson, 2008 WL 624904 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. Mar. IO, 2008) "Similarly lacking from the 
papers submitted by the petitioner (FIA) is sufficient proof that the parties entered into a written 
agreement to submit their dispute to arbitration. The only proof of such an agreement offered by 
the petitioner is a copy of what is labeled "Credit Card Agreement Additional Terms and 
Conditions." This document is undated, does not make a reference to any particular account or 
cardholder and is not signed by any party. The petitioner has not offered any proof that these 
terms and conditions, which include an arbitration provision, were ever actually accepted by the 
Respondent (Thompson), either in writing or by his use of the card." 
Galle v. MBNA, 2006 WL 839531 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 2006) "Galle did not sign an agreement 
with MBNA after his account was transferred. Thus, there is no evidence that Galle voluntarily 
and knowingly waives his right to access to the courts. For this reason, the arbitration provision 
is unenforceable." 
Gerber v. Citigroup, Inc., 2008 WL 596112, *l (E.D.Cal. Feb 29, 2008) "Because defendant has 
failed to demonstrate that plaintiff was bound to change in terms notices mailed to his home 
address under California law, Citibank has failed to demonstrate that a valid agreement to 
arbitrate exists." 
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MBNA v. Berlin, 2005 WL 3193850 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2005) "When the company filed 
an application to confirm and enforce the arbitration award, it only attached a copy of the 
arbitration award to its application. The magistrate determined that the trial court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case because the company had not filed all necessary documents 
required by Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2711.14 with its application." 
MBNA v. Nelson, 15 Misc.3d I !48(A), 2007 WL 1704618 (Table) (N.Y. Civ. Ct. May 24, 
2007) "The Petition is dismissed without prejudice, due to the failure of the Petitioner to provide 
the following proof: Allegation and. proof of the Petitioner's legal status, and whether it is 
authorized to do business in New York, in accordance with New York law; Complete copy of the 
actual retail credit contract, including any subsequent amendments, alleged to have been entered 
into between the Petitioner and the Respondent; Affidavit establishing Respondent received 
notice of the alleged agreement, including any subsequent amendments; Objective proof that the 
alleged agreement, and any amendments, issued by Petitioner are binding on Respondent; 
Allegation and proof that the arbitration award was affirmed; Snbmission of the calculations 
used by the arbitrator to arrive at the final award, the specific claims submitted by Petitioner for 
arbitration and the claims ruled upon by the arbitrator; Current and complete non-military 
affidavit." 
MBNA v. Straub, 815 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2006) "No agreement with an arbitration 
clause is tendered, nor is there a supporting affidavit establishing that any such agreement was 
binding. The notice of the arbitration session as mandated by the CPLR." 
11 
ARGUMENT IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR rN FrNDrNG rN FAVOR OF MBNA WHEN THE 
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF AN ARBITRATION AW ARD WAS 
DEFECTIVE WHEN FILED? 
MBNA states, "Appellants argue that Respondent's Application for Confirmation of 
Arbitration Award was defective when filed pursuant to 9 U.'S.C. § 13. However, such argument 
was never raised below, and therefore, cannot be considered or reviewed." 
Capps and Carroll refer this Court to their BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF 
DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE page 6 & 7 of 15 (R. Vol. I, p. 206-7), 
specifically, 
Other states have been protecting their residents from the unfair business practices of 
MBNA. In an April 28t11, 2006 decision, MBNA America Bank, NA. v. Loretta Credit 
(No. 94,380), attached as EXHIBIT A, the Kansas Supreme Court struck down an 
arbitration award after MBNA failed to provide any proof of an agreement to arbitrate. 
The Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] Title 9 U.S.C. § 13 requires that any motion or 
request for confirmation of an arbitration award include the arbitration agreement. 
Specifically: 
"9 U.S.C. § l 3. Papers filed with order on motions; judgment; docketing; force 
and effect; enforcement. 
The party moving for an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award 
shall, at the time such order is filed with the clerk for the entry of judgment 
thereon, also file the following papers with the clerk: 
(a) The agreement; the selection or appointment, if any, of an additional 
arbitrator or umpire; and each written extension of the time, if any, within 
which to make the award. 
(b) The award. 
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( c) Each notice, affidavit or other paper used upon an application to confirm, 
modify, or correct the award and a copy of each order of the court upon such 
an application." ( emphasis added). 
The agreement was not present in MBNA America Bank, NA. v. Credit when MBNA 
filed for confirmation, and was a major factor in the court's rejection of the arbitration 
award. This is a condition which is also present in this case. MBNA did not file the 
arbitration agreement with its request for confirmation of the award letter against 
Capps or Carroll. (Emphasis added). 
Other states have protected their residents from MBNA in a similar manner. Ohio 
also dismissed MBNA's application to confirm an arbitration award letter for the very 
same reason in MBNA America Bank, NA., v. Berlin, 2005 WL 3193850 (Ohio App. 9 
Dist.)." 
MBNA America Bank v. Credit is in the record at (R. Vol. I, p. 216- 220) and is now 
cited as, 132 P.3d 898 (Kansas 2006). In MBNA v. Berlin, 2005 WL 3193850 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Nov. 30, 2005), the court held, "When the company filed an application to confirm and enforce 
the arbitration award, it only attached a copy of the arbitration award to its application. The 
magistrate determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because 
the company had not filed all necessary documents required by Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2711.14 
with its application." See also MBNA v. Straub, 815 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2006). An 
agreement to arbitrate confers jurisdiction on the arbitrator and on the District Court to confirm 
the award. Without the agreement, there is no jurisdiction for the arbitrator to create the award 
letter, nor is there jurisdiction in the trial court to confirm the award. 
The trial court examined the MBNA v. Credit case (R. Vol. I, p. 347-50), noting the 
profound similarities between the two cases. The only difference noted by the trial court is (R. 
Vol. I, p. 350, L. 14- 15), "In contrast to MBNA v. Credit, I have found that an arbitration 
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agreement existed between the parties." Capps and Carroll have to ask; what is the purpose of 
reconsideration if the trial court simply uses its first decision to reject all new information? Isn't 
the function of a motion for reconsideration to re-make the initial decision based on the new 
information presented? Ifthere really was a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate, why 
wasn't it filed along with the request for confirmation as required? The trial court's decision was 
not based on substantial and competent evidence and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENTV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE ARBITRATION 
PROVISION, WHICH WAS ADDED BY A NEGATIVE OPTION WITHOUT 
EFFECTIVE NOTICE, DID NOT VIOLATE BASIC CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, WAS 
SUB ST ANTIALL YAND PROCEDURALLY CONSCIONABLE? 
MBNA argues that a "lack of voluntariness [sic] and lack of knowledge have not been 
established." Yet the Supplemental Affidavit of Capps (R. Vol. I, p. 315) states, "7. That I have 
never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA America Bank at 
any time." The Supplemental Affidavit of Carroll (R. Vol. I, p. 312) also states, "7. That I have 
never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA America Bank at 
any ti.me." These statements, under oath, certainly establish a lack of any voluntary agreement or 
assent to arbitration. Carroll's Affidavit in Support of Brief in Support of Opposition to 
Confirmation of Award Letter (R. Vol. I, p. 37) states, "4. That I have not been aware of any 
attempt from MBNA to alter the agreement to include an arbitration clause." Capps placed an 
affidavit on the court record with the same wording. These statements, under oath, certainly 
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establish a lack of knowledge concerning MBNA's attempted modification to include arbitration 
in its agreements. 
MBNA argues "There is nothing in the record evidencing high-pressure tactics, coercion, 
oppression, duress, or a great imbalance in bargaining power. There is nothing in the record 
evidencing a lack of understanding regarding the contract terms arising from the use of 
inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or complex legalistic language, the lack of opportunity 
to study the contract and inquire about its terms, or disparity in the sophistication, knowledge, or 
experience of the parties." That statement is only partially true. As Capps stated in his 
Supplemental Affidavit(R. Vol. I, p. 315), "4. That I open all mail which I receive addressed to 
me. 5. That I examine all of the contents of the envelope. 6. That I do not recall any offer or 
notice to amend the card agreement with MBNA America Bank to include arbitration." Carroll 
also stated in her Supplemental Affidavit (R. Vol. I, p. 312), "4. That I open all mail which I 
receive addressed to me. 5. That I examine all of the contents of the envelope. 6. That I do not 
recall any offer or notice to amend the card agreement with MBNA America Bank to include 
arbitration." These statements, under oath, certainly are evidence that there was a lack of 
opportunity for Capps and Carroll to study the alleged arbitration provision and inquire about its 
terms. As demonstrated by the results of the Lake - Snell study (R. Vol. I, p. 245-275), 7 out of 
8 to 9 out of 10 people did not read or understand the notice. AT&T's notice (subject of the 
Lake - Snell study) was mailed in a separate envelope, most of which were marked "Important 
Notice." MBNA mailed out their supposed notice along with the monthly bill and probably with 
other advertisements, making it much less noticeable. 
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In addition, the selection of the National Arbitration Forum [NAF] created a great 
imbalance in bargaining power within the arbitration process. In the record are the following 
documents evidencing systemic bias in favor of the repeat corporate client (MBNA): 
• Declaration of Michael Geist (R. Vol. I, p. 142- 145) 
• Deposition of Edward C. Anderson (R. Vol. I, p.146 - 151) 
• NAF letter (R. Vol. I, p.152) 
• NAF letter (R. Vol 1, p. 153 
• NAF 9ode of procedure (R. Vol. I, p. 154-155) 
• Declaration of Gregory Duhl (R. Vol. I, p. 156 - 160) 
On June 19, 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia heard and decided a· 
certified question from the Circuit Court of Lincoln County in Civil Action No. 00-C-146 (See 
Exhibit A): 
"The certified question is as follows: 
Whether a lender's form compulsory arbitration clause or rider, which mandates that all 
disputes arising out of a consumer transaction be submitted to a lender-designated decision 
maker compensated through a case-volume fee system whereby the decision maker's income 
as an arbitrator is dependant on continued referrals from the creditor, so impinges on 
neutrality and fundamental fairness that it is unconscionable and unenforceable under West 
Virginia law. 
The trial court answered the question in the affirmative. 
On June 13, 2002, this court issued an opinion in the case of State ex rel. Dunlap v. 
Berger,_ W.Va.~, _ S.E.2d_ (No. 30035, June 13 2002). Based on the opinion in 
Dunlap, and .particularly in light of the discussion at footnote 12 therein, the Court is of the 
opinion that the Circuit Court of Lincoln County correctly answered the certified question, and 
accordingly this matter is dismissed and the case is remanded to the circuit court.'' 
While MBNA argues that the arbitration provision is not unconscionable, the rest of Issue 
V is not addressed. The rest of the issues are uncontested: 
• There is no original agreement on the record; 
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• There is no proof that Delaware statute Title 5 § 952(a) applies; 
• There is no proof that Capps and Carroll intended to accept, or in fact did accept 
MBNA's offer to include an arbitration provision in the cardholder agreement; 
• There is no "meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration; and, 
• The "bill stuffer" notice was not effective. 
Delaware statute Title 5 § 952(a) begins, "Unless the agreement governing a revolving 
credit plan otherwise provides." MBNA did not place the original agreement on the record, so 
there is no proof that the agreement either provides for, or does not provide for, and as such there 
is no proof that Delaware statute Title 5 § 952(a) applies. MBNA bears the burden of proof that 
the Delaware statute applies. MBNA provided no such proof. Without the original agreement 
on the record, MBNA cannot prove that another agreement, governing or otherwise, is an 
authorized substitute for the original, or that changes of any kind were authorized by the original 
agreement. MBNA has failed to place any such evidence on the record. Accordingly, the 
decision of the trial court based on Delaware statute Title 5 § 952(a) that an agreement to 
arbitrate exists is not based on substantial and competent evidence and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT VI 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING CAPPS' AND CARROLL'S 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY 
(CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL DISPUTE) TO BE WAIVED THROUGH A 
"NEGATIVE OPTION" WITHOUT CAPPS AND CARROLL BOTH KNOWINGLY, 
INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY CONSENTING TO THE WAIVER? 
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MBNA argues that, "For all the reasons articulated above, the trial court did not err in 
finding that such agreement existed and was valid. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
finding that Appellants waived the right to a jury trial." The Supplemental Affidavits of Capps 
and Carroll (R. Vol. I, p. 315) and (R. Vol. I, p. 312) respectively state, "7. That I have never 
voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to arbitration with MBNA America Bank at any 
time." These statements, made under oath, at least raise the supposition that Capps and Carroll 
did not waive their rights to a jury trial. MBNA has provided no evidence, documentary or 
otherwise, demonstrating that Capps and Carroll knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived 
their right to a jury trial. 
In Badie v. Bank of America, 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 79 Cal.Rptr2d 273 (Cal.App. Dist.I 
11/03/1998), the court held, 
(39] Where, as in this case, a party has the unilateral right to change the terms of a 
contract, it does not act in an "objectively reasonable" manner (Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 
supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 141) when it attempts to "recapture" a foregone opportunity 
by adding an entirely new term which has no bearing on any subject, issue, right, or 
obligation addressed in the original contract and which was not within the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into. That is particularly true 
where the new term deprives the other party of his right to a jury trial and his right to 
select a judicial forum for dispute resolution." 
(59] "In light of the importance of the jury trial in our system of jurisprudence, any 
waiver thereof should appear in clear and unmistakable form." Where it is doubtful 
whether a party has waived his or her constitutionally-protected right to a jury trial, the 
question should be resolved in favor of preserving that right. (Id. At pp. 1127-1128; 
Byram v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 648, 654.) 
(61] We find no unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of the right to a jury trial either in 
the language of the change of terms provision or in any other part of the original account 
agreements. Nor do we find an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver in any customer's 
failure to close or stop using an account immediately after receiving the "bill stuffers" 
because, as even the trial court concluded, the notice contained in the "bill stuffer" was 
"not designed to achieve 'knowing consent'" to the ADR provision. 
( 64] However, the bank's interpretation of the change of terms provision would dispense 
with the requirement for a clear and unmistakable indication that the consumer intended 
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to waive the right to a jury trial. Because we find no unambiguous and unequivocal 
waiver of that right here, and because the right to select a judicial forum, whether a bench 
trial or a jury trial, as distinguished from arbitration or some other method of dispute 
resolution, is a substantial right not lightly to be deemed waived (Arista Films, Inc. v. 
Gilford Securities, Inc., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 502; Chan v. Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 643), the bank's interpretation of the change of 
terms provision must be rejected. 
In Discover Bank v. Shea, supra, in the court's choice of law analysis, the court held, 
"3. New Jersey has strong policy interests in protecting its citizens' rights to sue in court 
as well as their rights to jury trials. The waiver of rights must be clear, knowing, 
informed, without coercion and unequivocal. Delaware has no legitimate interests in 
having its law in this regard applied." 
In Discover Bank v. Shea, supra, the court also held, 
"The amendment to the agreement was included with a monthly statement, as a "bill 
stuffer" and not seen by Mr. Shea. Mr. Shea did not have a unconditional "right" to opt 
out of the arbitration clause since Discover admits that it would have closed Mr. Shea's 
account if he had not agreed to be bound by the arbitration clause. 
Mr. Shea has a substantial investment in the credit he has developed with Discover. If 
Mr. Shea's credit with Discover was terminated, he would have had to apply for new 
credit, which may not have been possible to obtain. The potential loss of credit which 
would have accompanied a rejection of the arbitration clause, effectively created a barrier 
to such rejection, making the issue of proper notice and consent that much more 
important. Mr. Shea completed no affirmative act to be bound by the arbitration clause, 
he never "consented" to it, and it cannot be applied in this case." 
See Galle v. MBNA, 2006 WL 839531 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 2006) "Galle did.not sign an 
agreement with MBNA after his acconnt was transferred. Thus, there is no evidence that Galle 
voluntarily and knowingly waives his right to access to the courts. For this reason, the 
arbitration provision is unenforceable." 
MBNA has provided no evidence whatsoever that Capps and Carroll knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily waived tl1eir constitutionally protected right to a trial by jury. The 
waiver of a substantive right cannot be assumed, but must be proven by substantial and 
competent evidence, which is lacking in this case. There was, and is, no agreement to arbitrate 
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this or any dispute between Capps, Carroll and MBNA. The decision of the trial court is not 
based on substantial and competent evidence and should be reversed. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Consumers are under an unprecedented assault on their rights through the mechanism of 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration. What started as an alternative to the traditional court system has 
gradually become a commercialized rubber-stamp system for large corporations interested in 
skirting the requirements of the law. On top of the list of biased arbitration organizations is the 
National Arbitration Fonnn [NAF]. On June 12, 2007, attorney F. Paul Bland, Jr., staff attorney 
for Public Justice (Formerly Trial Lawyers for Public Justice), testified before the Subcommittee 
on Commercial and Administrative Law of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on the 
Judiciary's Hearing on Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair to 
Consumers?" Some practices of the NAF were addressed, an excerpt of which follows: 
"In the last few months, there have also been two publicly disclosed episodes of 
arbitrators who were handling cases for the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF") being 
blackballed after ruling for consumers against NAF' s most prominent client, MBNA 
Bank. The first episode of an NAF arbitrator being blackballed is described in the 
deposition of Harvard Law professor Elizabeth Ba.rtholet, taken on September 26, 2006, 
by a lawyer challenging NAF as being biased in a consumer case against Gateway 
Computers. Professor Bartholet had also served as an independent contractor arbitrator 
for NAF, until she resigned. Her deposition describes how she was also blackballed by a 
credit card company after she ruled against it in a single arbitration. At the time that the 
credit card company decided to block her from hearing any more cases involving itself, 
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she was scheduled to hear a number of other cases. NAF sent out letters to the consumers 
falsely stating that she would no longer be the arbitrator in their cases, because she had a 
scheduling conflict. The professor, however, did not have a scheduling conflict; instead, 
NAF had sent out this explanation to conceal the fact that in reality she had been 
blackballed by a lender who did not like how she ruled in a past case. 
The second recent disclosure came in an article written by Richard Neely, a 
former justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court in the 2006 September/October issue 
of the West Virginia Lawyer. After retiring from the bench, Justice Neely was 
approached by NAF to serve as one of its independent-contractor arbitrators, and he 
agreed to do so. He reported that when he did not award a bank the full amount of 
attorneys' fees it asked for, that he found himself barred from handling anymore cases 
involving that bank. He explained that banks, as "professional litigants," can make use of 
their superior knowledge of arbitrators past decisions to help insure that their cases are 
heard by NAF arbitrators who will rule for them." 
A complete transcript of attorney F. Paul Bland's testimony is available upon request. 
Our main point is that while this Court may be limited in curtailing this rubber-stamp 
process within the NAF, it is not limited in curtailing the trial courts in the State ofidaho from 
simply acting as one more rubber-stamp in an unjust system of commercialized arbitration. This 
court can establish standards regarding the basic contract elements of providing documentary 
evidence of a signed arbitration agreement, the necessity of a clear, documented meeting of the 
minds regarding arbitration, clear and conscious recognition of a waiver of the consumer's right 
to a trial by jury, and the prohibition of unilateral amendments waiving consumer's 
constitutionally protected rights - especially when done through ineffective methods such as the 
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"bill stuffer" form of notice. The standards set forth in MBNA v. Straub and MBNA v. Nelson 
supra, are hereby suggested. 
The trial courts in the State ofidaho depend on this Court's guidance in establishing a 
minimum set of standards under which arbitration awards may be confirmed. The citizens of the 
State of Idaho depend even more on this Court protecting their rights in contracts of adhesion 
with corporate giants and biased commercial arbitration companies such as the NAF. The State 
ofldaho and this Court have established public policies to protect the citizens ofldaho over the 
years. Because of recent changes in the field of Alternative Dispute Resolution [ADR] it is time 
for this Court to clarify the policies regarding confirmation of arbitration awards to protect the 
citizens of the State of Idaho from the ravages of the new corporate greed imbedded in 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the commercial arbitration companies that cater to that 
greed. This Court has the authority and the responsibility to act in the interest of the people and 
citizens of the State ofldaho. Capps and Carroll pray that you do so now. 
Dated this 2_7'!! day of October 2008. 
nt, in propria persona 
Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff/Appellant, in propria persona 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F, Capps, do hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a true 
and correct cop'f,ff this APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to the attorney for the opposing 
party this 1:.7 day of October, 2008, by Certified Mail 
# 7o0G ZJSO OOCJ:5 ¾S:! 23YJ at the following address: 
Jeffrey M, Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P,O, Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
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This case involves a certified question from the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, 
in Civil Action No. 00-C-146. 
The certified question is as follows: 
Whether a lender's form compulsory arbitration clause or 
rider, which mandates that all disputes arising out of a 
consumer transaction be submitted to a lender-designated 
decision maker compensated through a case-volume fee 
system whereby the decision maker's income as an arbitrator 
is dependent on continued referrals from the creditor, so 
impinges on neutrality and fundamental fairness that it is 
unconscionable and unenforceable under West Virginia law. 
The trial court answered the question in the affirmative. 
On June 13, 2002, this Court issued an opinion in the case of State ex rel. Dunlap 
v. Berger,_ W.Va. _, _ S.E.2d _ (No. 30035, June 13, 2002). Based on the 
opinion in Dunlap, and particularly in light of the discussion at footnote 12 therein, the 
Court is of the opinion that the Circuit Court of Lincoln County correctly answered the 
certified question, and accordingly this matter is dismissed and the case is remanded to 
the circuit court. 
Justice Maynard would issue a full opinion in this case. 
Question Answered, Dismissed and Remanded. 
